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Computing Critical k-tuples in Power Networks
Kin Cheong Sou, Henrik Sandberg and Karl Henrik Johansson
Abstract—In this paper the problem of finding the sparsest (i.e.,
minimum cardinality) critical k-tuple including one arbitrarily
specified measurement is considered. The solution to this problem
can be used to identify weak points in the measurement set, or
aid the placement of new meters. The critical k-tuple problem
is a combinatorial generalization of the critical measurement
calculation problem. Using topological network observability
results, this paper proposes an efficient and accurate approximate
solution procedure for the considered problem based on solving a
minimum-cut (Min-Cut) problem and enumerating all its optimal
solutions. It is also shown that the sparsest critical k-tuple prob-
lem can be formulated as a mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) problem. This MILP problem can be solved exactly
using available solvers such as CPLEX and Gurobi. A detailed
numerical study is presented to evaluate the efficiency and the
accuracy of the proposed Min-Cut and MILP calculations.
NOTATION
A A subset of transmission lines whose removal
partitions the network into two disjoint parts.
E The set of all transmission lines.
G The graph of the power network.
H The Jacobian of the measurement function.
H(I,J) A submatrix of H, consisting of the rows and
columns in the index sets I and J respectively.
H(i, :) The ith row of matrix H.
¯I The complement of an index set I.
¯j The complement of a singleton set { j}.
M A large scalar constant treated as “infinity”
in the MILP procedure.
m The number of measurements (rows of H).
n The number of buses (columns of H).
S A subset of buses (i.e., S ⊂ V ).
S is used to define a partition of the network.
vi Node weights for bus i.
wi j Edge weights for transmission line {i, j}.
w˜i j Edge weights which also account for the bus
weights connected to {i, j}. w˜i j = wi j + vi+ v j.
V The set of all buses.
θ The n× 1 state vector (phase angles).
δ (S) Cut capacity of S. The sum of all weights of
the edges cut by the partition defined by S.
δinj(S) The sum of all weights of the buses connected
by edges which are cut by the partition of S.
˜δ (S) Modified cut capacity, where the edge weights
wi j are replaced by w˜i j.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Critical k-tuples
A modern SCADA/EMS system relies heavily on the state
estimator, which estimates the power network states (e.g., the
phase angles of bus voltages) based on measurements such
as transmission line power flows, bus power injections and
bus voltages. An important question related to state estimation
is whether the network is observable or not; whether the
states can be uniquely determined based on the available
measurements. This is a central issue of network observability
analysis (e.g., [1]–[9] and the references therein). While the
measurements are typically placed so that a power network is
observable, there exist weak points known as critical measure-
ments. By definition, if a critical measurement is lost (e.g.,
failure of a meter), then the network becomes unobservable
(i.e., the states can no longer be uniquely determined). The
notion of critical measurement also plays an important role in
another vital power network state estimation function, namely,
bad data detection (e.g., [3], [4], [10]–[12] and the references
therein). Specifically, a bad data detection scheme based on
measurement residual cannot identify whether a meter is faulty
or not if the corresponding measurement is critical. A gener-
alization of the concept of critical measurement is a critical
k-tuple, where k is any natural number. A critical k-tuple is
a set of k measurements such that if all measurements in the
set are lost then the network becomes unobservable. However,
losing any subset of p < k measurements would not result
in the loss of observability. A critical 2-tuple is also referred
to as a critical set, where bad data can be detected but not
identified (other terminologies include minimally dependent
set or bad data group, e.g., [13]–[15]). Critical k-tuples of
larger cardinalities are also of practical interest, as will be
explained later. How to compute them is the main topic of
this paper.
While critical k-tuple, network observability, and bad data
detection are closely related, the mathematical tools to analyze
them are different. While critical k-tuples provide the mea-
surements to remove to render the network unobservable, the
topic of network observability is the opposite. They include
checking whether a network is observable or not, and in
case of an unobservable network which parts of it is still
observable (i.e., finding observable islands). Likewise, critical
k-tuple computation and bad data detection are separate issues:
Essentially, the measurement residual based bad data detection
theory investigates what detection can be achieved beyond
the limitations imposed by critical measurements or critical
k-tuples. These techniques are, consequently, not concerned
with finding the critical k-tuples.
Techniques to identify critical 1-tuples (i.e., critical mea-
surements) and critical 2-tuples (i.e., critical sets) are
2known (e.g., [3], [11], [13]–[16]). In [17] and [18] the calcu-
lation of critical k-tuples for k > 2 is considered. However, the
procedure in [18] is efficient only for finding critical k-tuples
of lower cardinalities (i.e., k ≤ 3), as will be explained and
numerically demonstrated later in this paper. The computation
of critical k-tuples is inherently computationally intensive,
because finding critical k-tuples amounts to a combinatorial
search, as will be discussed in detail in this paper.
B. Problem Formulation and its Motivation
The general setup of this paper is the standard state es-
timation problem over a linearized DC power flow network
[3], [4]. The particular problem considered is to find the
sparsest (i.e., minimum cardinality) critical k-tuples involving
at least one arbitrarily specified measurement. By parameter-
izing the sparsest critical k-tuple problem with the specified
measurement, it is possible to examine all weak points in the
network and not just the weakest point at the boundary of the
network. The precise description of the considered problem
is as follows. Let m be the number of measurements in the
power network, and n be the number of states (i.e., the phase
angles of the bus voltage phasors). It is assumed that m > n.
Let H ∈ Rm×n be the Jacobian of the state-to-measurement
function in a linearized model. Denote H(I,J) as the submatrix
of H formed by including the rows in an index set I and
the columns in an index set J. Also denote ¯I and ¯J as the
complements of I and J, respectively. Then according to, for
instance [4] (Theorem p.165), the measurements in an index
set I form a critical k-tuple if and only if rank(H( ¯I, ¯j))< n−1
for any j. Here j is the index of an arbitrary reference bus, and
¯j denotes the set of all indices except j. The sparsest critical
k-tuple problem for a specified measurement i can be written
as:
minimize
I
card(I)
subject to rank(H( ¯I, ¯j))< n− 1
i ∈ I
(1)
where card(·) denotes either the cardinality of a set or the
number of nonzero entries of a vector, depending on the input
argument. Notice that (1) does not explicitly impose the con-
dition that I cannot contain any strictly proper subsets whose
removal makes H rank deficient. However, this condition is
always satisfied at optimality. Problem (1) requires a combi-
natorial search of the rows whose removal makes the H matrix
rank deficient. In general, no efficient algorithm is available
to exactly solve (1). However, specializing (1) to the case of
power system state estimation results in a significant solution
efficiency gain because of the special structure of H. The
demonstration of this is the main contributions of the paper.
Problem (1) is motivated from the following applications:
1) Identifying measurements in small cardinality critical k-
tuples: While not directly solved as an optimization problem,
(1) is addressed in [18] (Definition 1, even though the term
“critical set” in [18] has a different meaning than the one here).
For any given measurement set, [18] finds the measurements
such that optimal objective value of (1) is less than or equal
to three. This information is used to determine the set of
additional measurements to be included, so that the network
becomes more robust to meter failures. Other, but related,
meter inclusion problems are also considered in [19], [20].
This paper, on the other hand, solves (1) for all i, regardless
of the corresponding optimal objective value. These include
the measurements in the critical k-tuples of cardinalities less
than or equal to three as in [18]. However, the information of
the sparsest critical k-tuples of larger cardinalities can be used
for a measurement inclusion scheme with a more stringent
robustness requirement.
2) Planning of measurement sets: Instead of expanding a
pre-existing measurement set as in [18]–[20], it is possible to
obtain a cost effective yet meter failure robust measurement set
by removing appropriate measurements from the full set. The
solution to (1) with H corresponding to the full measurement
set can provide insight into which measurements can be re-
moved. This measurement removal strategy has the advantage
that it does not assume any pre-existing measurement set
which can affect the final measurement set. In Section V-E
a numerical example is presented to demonstrate the potential
of the above measurement removal scheme.
3) Cyber-security of power networks: Based on a result in
[21] (Corollary 1 in Section II-B), problem (1) is equivalent
to another cardinality minimization problem: (2) to be de-
scribed in Section II-B. Problem (2) arises from cyber-security
analysis of power networks (e.g., [21]–[25]). In particular,
[24]–[26] analyze the vulnerability of each measurement i
using (2), where a malicious attacker inflicts “bad data” in a
critical k-tuple. In this case, sparsest critical k-tuples of larger
cardinalities (i.e., > 3) are of interest because the “bad data” is
intentional instead of occurring by chance. The solution of (2)
can be used to identify the weak points in the measurement
set in the cyber-security setting.
Finally, note that for complete safeguard against bad data
or cyber-attack, the set of all critical k-tuples (in addition to
the sparsest ones found by solving (1)) should be computed.
However, this would require an enumeration which is not com-
putationally tractable for realistic applications. The calculation
of the sparsest critical k-tuples in (1) can identify the network
vulnerabilities, subject to practical computation constraints.
C. Contributions and Related Work
This paper presents two methods to solve (1). The first
method is efficient but suboptimal. It utilizes a sufficient
condition for critical k-tuples candidates in [2], [21]. This
condition is topological. In the setting of this paper, the
condition states that for any set of transmission lines whose cut
would separate the network into two disjoint parts, removing
all line and injection measurements associated with these
transmission lines would make the network unobservable.
Using this sufficient condition, a restricted version of the
sparsest critical k-tuple problem in (1) can be stated as follows.
If the specified measurement i is a line power flow, then
the corresponding transmission line must be cut. On the
other hand, if the specified measurement is a power injection
at a bus, then one of the incident transmission lines must
be cut. Then the rest of the transmission lines are cut (or
not cut) in order to minimize the number of measurements
3removed, while dividing the network into two parts. This
cut problem, while being a restricted version of (1), is still
combinatorial. However, if the injection measurements are
not directly counted towards the optimization objective (to be
made precise later), then this modified problem becomes a
classical minimum cut problem (Min-Cut) (e.g., [27]). Min-
Cut admits scalable solution algorithms (e.g., [28], [29]). The
solution to the Min-Cut problem can be used as a suboptimal
solution to (1). In fact, due to [30]–[32], it is possible to
efficiently enumerate all optimal solutions to the Min-Cut
problem and pick the best available suboptimal solutions to
(1). This is the idea of the first method of this paper.
Two previous results are related to the first proposed
method. As mentioned before, [18] addresses (1). In [18], a
(non-unique) set of measurements is chosen to be the basic
measurements. Then the critical k-tuples containing exactly
one basic measurement can be identified using a matrix
factorization approach generalizing the one in [3] (Chapter
4.5.4). To find critical k-tuples containing more than one basic
measurements, a recursive application of the matrix factoriza-
tion approach for finding critical k-tuples with only one basic
measurement is required. For larger k, the recursion becomes
more expensive as there are
(
n
p
)
possible combinations of p
basic measurements to be included in the critical k-tuples, for
different p ≤ k. To solve (1) for all possible i, in total
n
∑
p=1
(
n
p
)
applications of the matrix factorization procedure are required.
The computation effort is exponential in terms of network size
(i.e., the number of buses n). In summary, [18] is accurate
but the procedure is efficient only for a sparse measurement
set (so that critical k-tuples of high cardinalities will not be
encountered). The proposed method in this paper, on the other
hand, is efficient for solving (1) irrespective of the cardinality
of the critical k-tuple, because (1) is approximately solved
via Min-Cut. However, as it will be numerically demonstrated
in Section V, the accuracy of the proposed method suffers
when the measurement set becomes sparse. In this sense, [18]
and the proposed method are complementary to each other.
Another closely related work is [21], which considers a variant
of (1). In this variant, the sparsest critical k-tuple also contains
at least one measurement. However, instead of being user-
specified, this measurement is chosen by the optimization to
find the sparsest non-empty critical k-tuple. Solving (1) for all
i leads to the solution to the problem in [21] but the converse
is not true. In addition, [21] does not pose their problem as (1)
defined in this paper. Most importantly, the problem in [21] is
posed as a submodular function minimization problem [33],
[34]. While theoretically polynomial-time algorithms exist for
solving this problem (notably the ellipsoid method [35] and
more recently [36] of which the complexity is O(m8 log(m))),
no practically efficient algorithms for this class of problem
have been observed. On the other hand, the Min-Cut problem
encountered by the proposed method can be solved efficiently
both in theory and in practice. For example, the complexity
of [28] is O(mn+ n2 log(n)). The practical efficiency will be
demonstrated by the numerical experiment later in this paper.
The second proposed method, based on mixed integer linear
programming (MILP), is exact under a mild assumption, but it
is less time-efficient. The method is based on the equivalence
between (1) and (2), to be described in Section II-B. This
means that (1) can be solved by instead solving (2). Previous
attempts to approximately solve (2) include, for instance, [22]
describing an attempt to use matching pursuit (e.g., [37]),
and [38] about the application of LASSO [39]. The MILP
formulation, based on [26], does not admit any polynomial
time solution algorithms in general. However, there exist good
MILP solvers such as CPLEX [40] or Gurobi [41]. The
major novelty of this second contribution of the paper is the
combination of [21] and [26].
D. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
three known theorems from [2] and [21] are reviewed, and
a corollary is derived. These theorems form the theoretical
foundation of this paper. Section II also reviews the Min-Cut
problem, which is an important part of the proposed algorithm.
Section III describes the first contribution of the paper: a
Min-Cut based algorithm which makes use of the topological
characterization of network observability to find the sparsest
critical k-tuples. In Section IV the second contribution, the
exact MILP formulation, is derived with some properties
discussed. In Section V some case studies are presented to
evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Finally
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
This section reviews some known results needed for the
derivation of the contributions of this paper. Theorems adopted
from known sources are stated without proof.
A. A Topological Sufficient Condition for Critical k-tuple
Candidates
The first statement is adopted from [2] (Theorem 5). It
provides a sufficient and necessary condition for network
observability in terms of spanning trees, which are loop-free
connected subgraphs of the power network retaining all buses
but subsets of the transmission lines.
Theorem 1: A power network is observable if and only
if there exists a spanning tree with an assignment function,
mapping from the set of the transmission lines in the spanning
tree to the set of line power flow and injection measurements of
the original power network. The assignment function satisfies
the following properties:
1) Two distinct spanning tree transmission lines map to two
distinct measurements.
2) If the line power flow of a spanning tree transmission
line is measured, then this transmission line maps to its
own line measurement under the assignment function.
3) If the line power flow of a spanning tree transmission
line is not measured, then the injection measurement of
one of the two terminal buses of this transmission line
is the value of the assignment function.
The following theorem, which is the main theoretical basis
of this paper, is adopted from Theorem 2 of [21]. It states
4that if an appropriate choice of measurements are removed,
then it becomes impossible to form any spanning tree with
an assignment function defined as in Theorem 1. Hence, the
statement provides a sufficient condition for finding candidates
for critical k-tuples.
Theorem 2: Let A be any set of transmission lines whose
cut would divide the power network into two disjoint parts.
Then removing all line power flow measurements in A and
all power injection measurements of the buses connected by
the lines in A would render the power network unobservable.
Remark 1: Any spanning tree of the network contains at
least one transmission line in A . However, under the mea-
surement removal scheme in Theorem 2, it is impossible to
define any assignment function in Theorem 1 for this line.
Hence the network becomes unobservable.
Remark 2: While Theorem 2 provides the sets of measure-
ments whose removal would render the network unobservable,
these sets are not necessarily critical k-tuples since their
subsets might also render the network unobservable.
Remark 3: The original version of Theorem 2, as in [21], is
more general in that it allows the situations in which A divides
the network into more than two disjoint parts. However, the
method proposed in this paper cannot exploit the additional
generality.
B. Sparsest Critical k-tuple Problem as a Cardinality Mini-
mization Problem
The following cardinality minimization problem has been
studied in power network cyber-security (e.g., [22], [25]):
minimize
θ
card(Hθ )
subject to H(i, :)θ = 1 (2)
The following theorem, adopted from Theorem 1 in [21],
establishes that the sparsest critical k-tuple problem in (1) is
equivalent to (2).
Theorem 3: An index set I is a feasible solution to (1) if
and only if there exists a feasible solution θ in (2) such that
H( j, :)θ = 0 whenever j /∈ I.
Theorem 3 implies the following statement (proved in Ap-
pendix) establishing the equivalence between (1) and (2).
Corollary 1: The optimization problems in (1) and (2) are
equivalent in that θ ⋆ is an optimal solution to (2) if and only
if I⋆ = { j H( j, :)θ ⋆ 6= 0} is an optimal solution to (1).
C. Min-Cut Problem on an Undirected Graph
Consider an undirected graph G = (V ,E ) where V and E
denote the set of nodes and the set of edges respectively, and
let each edge {i, j} ∈ E be weighted with a scalar wi j. Let
S ⊂ V be any subset of V . Define the cut capacity function
δ (S), ∑
{i, j}∈E
wi j such that either (a) i ∈ S and j /∈ S
or (b) i /∈ S and j ∈ S.
(3)
For any two distinct nodes s and t, the s− t Min-Cut problem
seeks to find a partition of V into V = S ∪ (V \ S) such
that s and t are in different partitions, and the cut capacity
is minimized:
minimize
S⊂V
δ (S)
subject to s ∈ S and t /∈ S (4)
For more detail regarding the Min-Cut problem in (4), see
for example [27]. For efficient solution algorithms, see for
example [28], [29]. The Min-Cut problem is a subproblem to
be solved in the proposed critical k-tuple calculation algorithm
to be described in the next section.
III. APPROXIMATE CRITICAL K-TUPLE CALCULATION VIA
MIN-CUT OPTIMIZATION
A. A Graph-Oriented Optimization Problem Related to (1)
The sufficient condition in Theorem 2 provides a topological
characterization of a subset of the solution candidates of the
sparsest critical k-tuple problem in (1). This characterization
leads to a graph-oriented optimization problem which is re-
lated to, but not exactly the same as, (1). The development is
as follows. Denote the power network as G = (V ,E ), where
V is the set of all buses and E is the set of all transmission
lines. Then the set A in Theorem 2, whose cut would partition
G , can be characterized by a bus subset S ⊂ V such that
A =
{
{i, j} either (a) i ∈ S and j /∈ S or (b) i /∈ S and j ∈ S}
(5)
To describe the number of removed measurements associated
with S (i.e., A ) according to Theorem 2, the following
definitions are required. Let wi j be the number of meters
on a transmission line {i, j} ∈ E , and v j be the number of
injection flow meters on a bus j ∈ V . Then associated with
S, the number of line power flow measurements to remove is
δ (S) defined in (3). In addition, the number of power injection
measurements to remove can be defined as
δinj(S), ∑
j ∈V
v j such that either
(a) j ∈ S and ∃ i ∈ (V \ S) s.t. {i, j} ∈ E
or (b) j ∈ (V \ S) and ∃ i ∈ S s.t. {i, j} ∈ E
Hence, associated with S, the total number of measurements
to be removed is δ (S)+ δinj(S). Lastly, the constraint in (1)
that one specified measurement must be included in the critical
k-tuple should be enforced. For simplicity of discussion, for
the moment it is assumed that the specified measurement is a
line power flow. The case of power injection will be handled
in the end of this section. Now suppose the specified line
power flow meter i is on transmission line {s, t}, then the
corresponding topological constraint is that s ∈ S and t /∈ S. In
summary, the graph oriented optimization problem, set up as
an approximation to (1), is described as:
minimize
S⊂V
δ (S)+ δinj(S)
subject to s ∈ S and t /∈ S (6)
Strictly speaking an optimal solution to (6) is a set of buses,
with the corresponding set of “cut” transmission lines defined
in (5). However, it is more convenient to treat the optimal
solution as the corresponding set of measurements to be
52 2(1)
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meter bus
Fig. 1: Illustration of the modified cut capacity function. Left:
Metering scenario in (6). Right: Transmission line metering
scenario pertaining to ˜δ (S) in (7). The number in the paren-
thesis indicates the number of times a meter is repeated. If
both 1-2 and 1-3 are cut, the true cost δ (S) + δinj(S) is 4.
However, the approximate cost ˜δ (S) is 5.
removed, as prescribed by Theorem 2. Solving (6) yields a
sparse set measurements whose removal makes the network
unobservable. The numerical experiment in Section V will
demonstrate the usefulness of (6). However, it should be
emphasized that an optimal solution to (6) is not necessarily
a sparsest critical k-tuple in (1). The reason is twofold. First,
since Theorem 2 is a sufficient condition, (6) searches only
through a subset of the sets of measurements whose removal
would render the network unobservable. Second, as pointed
out in Remark 2, an optimal solution to (6) does not even need
to be a critical k-tuple. These restrictions will be demonstrated
by the numerical experiment in Section V.
B. Min-Cut Approximate Solution Procedure for (1)
Compared with the tractable Min-Cut problem in (4), (6)
is a combinatorial optimization problem because of the addi-
tional term δinj(S) in the objective function. To overcome the
computational difficulty, it is proposed in this paper that δinj(S)
is indirectly accounted for by solving the following Min-Cut
problem:
minimize
S⊂V
˜δ (S)
subject to s ∈ S and t /∈ S, (7)
where ˜δ (S) is defined according to (3) with modified edge
weights w˜i j , wi j + vi + v j for all {i, j} ∈ E , with wi j, vi and
v j defined in Section III-A. ˜δ (S) corresponds to a modified
metering scenario where an injection meter of a bus is moved
to all incident transmission line(s). However, this modification
can lead to overcounting of injection meters as opposed to
solving (6). See Fig. 1 for an illustration. Since (6) and (7) have
the same constraint, the optimal solution to (7) is a suboptimal
solution to (6). In addition, by the results in [30]–[32], it is
possible to efficiently enumerate all optimal solutions to the
Min-Cut problem in (7). Hence, the best available suboptimal
solution to (6) can be chosen. However, it is emphasized
that the strategy of solving (7) can only provide a sparse set
of measurements including {s, t}, and the removal of these
measurements makes the network unobservable. From (1) to
(6) and then to (7) these two transitions induce their respective
limitations. As it was explained earlier, (1) and (6) are two
different optimization problems. Moreover, solving (7) is not
equivalent to solving (6), as illustrated in Fig. 1. The quality
of approximately solving (6) via (7) depends on the ratio
between the number of transmission line measurements and
bus injection measurements. In the extreme case where there is
no injection measurement, (7) is the same as (6). The accuracy
and efficiency of the proposed Min-Cut procedure will be
numerically assessed in Section V. The following algorithm
summarizes the Min-Cut based approximate solution proce-
dure for (1), where the specified measurement is a line power
flow on a transmission line.
Algorithm 1: Min-Cut procedure for transmission line
case:
Step 1
In the power network graph G = (V ,E ), define arc
weights w˜i j as the number of meters on a transmis-
sion line {i, j} ∈ E , plus the number of meters on
buses i and j.
Step 2
Suppose the specified transmission line is {s, t} ∈ E .
Setup a s− t Min-Cut problem as in (7). Solve (7)
using algorithms such as [28], [29] for an optimal
solution, which is a set of “cut” transmission lines.
The line power flows measurements and injections
measurements at the terminal buses constitute a
suboptimal solution to the sparest critical k-tuple
problem in (1).
Step 3
Use the results in [30]–[32] to enumerate all optimal
solutions to (7). Pick the best suboptimal solution to
(1) among all optimal solutions to (7).
Even the best available suboptimal solution to (1) might not
be a critical k-tuple in that there might be a strictly proper
subset whose removal makes the network unobservable. To
make sure a critical k-tuple is obtained, an enumeration is
required to see which measurements in the suboptimal solution
can be eliminated. However, since the suboptimal solution
typically contains very few measurements, the enumeration
is not expensive.
In the case where the specified measurement i in (1) is
a power injection on a bus, the following procedure can be
applied:
Algorithm 2: Min-Cut procedure for bus injection case:
Step 1
Let G = (V ,E ) be the power network graph and
let i ∈ V be the bus with the considered injection
measurement. For each j ∈ V such that {i, j} ∈ E ,
apply Algorithm 1 on transmission line {i, j}.
Step 2
Among all solutions provided by Algorithm 1 applied
to {i, j}, pick the one with the minimum cost in (1)
as the best available solution to (1).
The numerical examples in Section V illustrate the perfor-
mance of these algorithms.
6IV. EXACT SPARSEST CRITICAL K-TUPLE PROBLEM
FORMULATION AS A MILP PROBLEM
Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 state that the sparsest critical
k-tuple problem in (1) can be solved by solving the cardinality
minimization problem in (2). Problem (2) can be formulated
as a MILP problem, as mentioned in [26]. The key to the
formulation is the counting of the cardinality of vector Hθ . To
achieve this, an additional binary decision vector y ∈ {0,1}m
and a scalar constant M > 0 are needed. If M is large enough,
then the constraint
|H( j, :)θ | ≤ My( j)
provides a cardinality counting mechanism via y. If |H( j, :
)θ |> 0, then y( j) = 1. If |H( j, :)θ |= 0, then y( j) can be either
0 or 1. However, since (2) seeks to minimize the cardinality
of Hθ , as it will clear shortly, y( j) must be zero at optimality.
The constant M must be chosen large enough so that it is
larger than max
j
{|H( j, :)θ ⋆|} for at least one optimal solution
θ ⋆ of (2). In the special case where all line power flows are
measured, the method in [26] can be used to compute M. In
other cases, the general guideline is that M should be as large
as possible, before the optimization solver complains about
numerical difficulties. Suppose θ 0 is a typical state vector
under normal operation, then α max |Hθ
0|
min |Hθ 0| with some α > 1
can be a reasonable guess for M. The choice of M is the
only heuristic part of the otherwise exact sparsest critical k-
tuple problem formulation. The MILP formulation of (2) is as
follows:
minimize
θ , y
∑
j
y( j)
subject to Hθ ≤ My
−Hθ ≤ My
H(i, :)θ = 1
y( j) ∈ {0,1} ∀ j
(8)
Note that since the objective function is ∑
j
y( j), at optimality
for any j such that |H( j, :)θ | = 0, the corresponding y( j)
must be zero. Hence, ∑
j
y( j) = card(Hθ ). Finally, notice that
if the measurements in a certain set P are considered very
reliable and are immune from faults, then (8) can be modified
accordingly by adding the constraint y( j) = 0 for all j ∈P .
V. CASE STUDY
Numerical experiment results are demonstrated in this sec-
tion. All computations are performed on a laptop with an
Intel Core i5 2.53GHz CPU and 4GB of memory. All Min-
Cut problems are solved in MATLAB using [42], which calls
the libraries from [43]. All MILP problems are solved in
MATLAB using Gurobi [41] via Gurobi Mex [44].
A. Comparison with the Procedure in [18]
First, problem (1), for each possible specified measurement
i, is solved using three methods. The first method is the
recursive critical k-tuple calculation procedure in [18] im-
plemented by the authors. As in [18], only critical k-tuples
containing three basic measurements are sought. The second
method is the proposed Min-Cut procedure in Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 in Section III. The third method is the
MILP procedure (with M = 100) in Section IV. The solution
of the MILP procedure is used as a reference for accuracy.
The IEEE 14-bus benchmark system is analyzed, with two
different measurement sets. The first measurement set is from
[18] (Section IV, measurement set of Scenario 1), containing
measurements from 9 out of 14 buses and 6 out of 19 trans-
mission lines. The second measurement set contains all bus
and transmission line measurements, which may be of interest
for meter placement. For each i, the procedure in [18] (with
three basic measurements) and Min-Cut might only provide
an overestimate of the cardinality of the sparsest critical k-
tuple. Table I lists the percentages of i with overestimation,
the average overestimation (over all i) and the average relative
overestimation (relative to the cardinality of the corresponding
sparsest critical k-tuple).
Table I confirms the statement in Section I-C that the
procedure in [18] and Min-Cut should be used in different
measurement settings. [18] performs better in a sparse mea-
surement set, while Min-Cut is a better choice in a dense
measurement set.
TABLE I: Comparison between the procedure in [18], Min-
Cut and MILP for the IEEE 14-bus system
measurement set 1 (sparse metering) [18] Min-Cut MILP
solve time (s) 0.04 0.02 3.6
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 93 0
average overestimation 0 1.07 0
average relative overestimation (%) 0 75 0
measurement set 2 (full metering) [18] Min-Cut MILP
solve time (s) 10 0.03 17
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 26.5 0 0
average overestimation 4.1 0 0
average relative overestimation (%) 67.7 0 0
B. The Effect of the Proportion of Line Power Flow Measure-
ments on the Min-Cut Procedure
As explained in Section III, the Min-Cut procedure for (1)
achieves computation efficiency by approximately counting
the injection measurements. Hence, the relative ratio between
the line power flow and bus injection measurements affects
the approximation quality of the Min-Cut procedure. In this
subsection, the relationship between approximation quality
and the proportion of transmission line measurements in the
network is considered.
The IEEE 14-bus, 57-bus and 118-bus benchmark systems
are considered. The network topologies are from MATPOWER
[45]. For each system, 11 different measurement sets are
considered. Each measurement set contains all injection mea-
surements, but the proportions of removed line power flow
measurements increase as 0%, 10%, . . . , 100%. The removed
line measurements are randomly chosen. A study similar to
the one in Section V-A is performed, testing only the proposed
Min-Cut and MILP procedures. The above study can be con-
sidered as “one sample” of a random experiment involving a
sequence of 11 measurement sets for each benchmark system.
7The randomness stems from choice of the removed line flow
measurements. To examine the typical phenomena, the above
random experiment is repeated five times. Table II shows the
mean value (over 5 experiments) of the performance and error
statistics similar to those in Table I.
While not seen from Table II, the computation time for Min-
Cut remains roughly the same. The increase in solve time
ratio (up to about 0.36 when 100% of line measurements
are removed) is due to the decrease in solve time of the
MILP procedure. In general, Min-Cut is more efficient than
MILP. In terms of approximation error, for up to 90% of
line measurement removal, Min-Cut results in at most 7% of
measurements whose sparsest critical k-tuple cardinalities are
overestimated (the number is down to 3% for up to 40% of
line measurement removal). On average, the overestimation is
by about 1 measurement with the maximum observed in the
experiment being 3 measurements (not shown in Table II).
Finally, the average relative overestimation is at worst 35%
(e.g., overestimation by 1 measurement for a critical 3-tuple).
C. The Effect of the Proportion of Injection Measurements and
Arbitrary Measurements on the Min-Cut Procedure
In this subsection, the experiment in Section V-B is repeated
for the 118-bus benchmark system with a difference in the
definition of the measurement sets. Two cases are considered.
In the first case, each measurement set contains all line power
flow measurements and different proportions of the injection
measurements are randomly removed. In the second case,
different proportions of arbitrary measurements (injection or
line) are randomly removed in a way that the resulted network
is still observable. Table III lists the relevant statistics for
the first case and suggests (from the fourth row) that the
Min-Cut procedure is more accurate when the transmission
lines are more densely metered. On the other hand, Table IV
lists the statistics for the second case. In this case, at most
1 − 118/(118 + 186) ≈ 41% of the measurements can be
removed before the network become unobservable. However,
random removal of 40% of the measurements typically results
in a unobservable network, and hence the corresponding result
is not shown in Table IV. Table IV confirms again that the
Min-Cut procedure is efficient and accurate for relatively dense
measurement sets.
D. Time Efficiency of Min-Cut and MILP for Large Networks
This numerical study investigates the possible advantage of
the proposed Min-Cut procedure for the sparsest critical k-
tuple analysis for larger scale power networks. The networks
considered are the IEEE 118-bus, IEEE 300-bus and the
Polish 2383-bus systems. The topologies of these networks
are obtained using MATPOWER [45]. On each transmission
line of the benchmark systems, there are two line power flow
meters (one from each terminal bus). In addition, all power
injections are measured. For each of the benchmark system,
problem (1) is solved using the Min-Cut procedure for all
possible specified measurement i. For the 118 and 300 bus
cases, the Min-Cut procedure is experimentally found to be
exact, compared with solving the MILP formulation in (8).
For the 2383-bus case, only 14 instances of (8) are solved.
For all these 14 instances Min-Cut also provides the correct
estimates. The computation times for using the proposed Min-
Cut procedure and solving (8) are listed in Table V. This
numerical study again assures the efficiency and accuracy
of the proposed Min-Cut procedure in the case when all
transmission lines and buses are metered.
E. Using Critical k-tuple Information for Meter Placement
While not the main focus of this paper, a possible use of
the critical k-tuple information in (1) is for meter placement.
Problem (1) is solved for all specified measurement i for the
IEEE 6-bus benchmark system (see Fig. 2). It is assumed
that the network is fully metered (with 6 injection and 11
line power flow measurements). The Min-Cut procedure (i.e.,
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2) is used to solve (1). In total, 17
critical k-tuples are found. Then for each measurement i, Fig. 3
shows the number of critical k-tuples containing i. However,
note that by solving (1) for all specified measurement i, all
sparsest critical k-tuples are not found. Hence, Fig. 3 only
shows the lower bounds for the true number of critical k-tuples
containing i. Fig. 3 indicates that measurement 12 is probably
not important (as far as network observability is concerned),
because only one critical k-tuple contains it and none of the
other 16 critical k-tuples will be affected by the removal of
measurement 12. This is consistent with the network topology
in Fig. 2, since measurement 12 is the line power flow
measurement between bus 2 and bus 5 (i.e., the two buses
with the largest degree). On the other hand, Fig. 3 suggests
that measurements 2 and 5 (i.e., power injections at bus 2
and bus 5) are definitely important because they are involved
in many critical k-tuples. This is again consistent with the
topology in Fig. 2 since each of these injection measurements
can substitute one of the five line measurements in case any
one of them fails. Finally, note that the same analysis here can
be carried out for larger scale networks where it becomes less
obvious from the topology which measurements are important
or unimportant.
1 2 3
4 5 6
bus
Fig. 2: IEEE 6-bus system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a version of the sparsest critical k-tuple
problem is considered. The sparsest critical k-tuple is sought
for one arbitrarily specified measurement. It is possible to
8TABLE II: Ensemble mean of the solve time and error statistics for the case study in Section V-B
14-bus
line meas. removal (relative to total lines) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
line meas. removal (relative to total meas.) (%) 0 6 12 18 24 29 35 41 47 53 58
solve time ratio (Min-Cut/MILP) ×10−4 90 97 110 140 151 175 262 369 557 924 3642
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 0.63 1.0 1.4 3.1 5.4 6.0 5.5 6.1 6.9 86
average overestimation 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.8 1.0
average relative overestimation (%) 0 1.7 3.1 5.7 9.0 12 20 21 22 23 50
57-bus
line meas. removal (relative to total lines) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
line meas. removal (relative to total meas.) (%) 0 5.8 12 18 23 29 35 40 47 53 58
solve time ratio (Min-Cut/MILP) ×10−4 1.5 2.1 2.7 2.4 5.9 6.6 9.5 17 18 36 2740
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.95 2.1 3.2 3.0 2.2 0.92 96
average overestimation 0 0.4 0.6 0.65 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.2 1.1
average relative overestimation (%) 0 4.7 8.9 12 14 11 14 15 23 5.0 53
118-bus
line meas. removal (relative to total lines) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
line meas. removal (relative to total meas.) (%) 0 6.2 12 18 24 31 37 43 49 55 61
solve time ratio (Min-Cut/MILP) ×10−4 2.1 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.9 4.6 11 1116
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 0.77 0.90 1.4 2.7 4.2 5.4 6.7 6.7 5.7 87
average overestimation 0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
average relative overestimation (%) 0 13 15 14 17 19 22 24 27 35 54
TABLE III: Ensemble mean of the solve time and error statistics for the case study in Section V-C with varying injection
measurement proportion
bus meas. removal (relative to total buses) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
bus meas. removal (relative to total meas.) (%) 0 3.9 7.8 12 16 19 23 27 31 34 39
solve time ratio (Min-Cut/MILP) ×10−4 2.1 3.2 6.4 9.7 18 33 61 108 185 404 1211
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 0.61 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.2 2.6 2.3 1.4 1.1 0
average overestimation 0 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.8 0
average relative overestimation (%) 0 16 14 15 16 18 19 20 22 15 0
TABLE IV: Ensemble mean of the solve time and error statistics for the case study in Section V-C with varying arbitrary
measurement proportion
meas. removal (relative to total meas.) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50
solve time ratio (Min-Cut/MILP) ×10−4 2.1 3.3 8.9 21 110 345
percent of meas. with overestimation (%) 0 1.0 5.0 7.6 20 35
average overestimation 0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4
average relative overestimation (%) 0 12 24 28 45 69
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Fig. 3: Number of critical k-tuples containing any specific
measurement.
identify the weak points in the power network by listing
all measurements which might form critical k-tuples with
small cardinality, even though this is short of a complete
enumeration of all possible sparsest critical k-tuples. This
TABLE V: CPU times for solving all instances of (1) in the
118, 300 and 2383 bus systems
Method 118-bus 300-bus 2383-bus
MILP 763 sec 6708 sec (projected) 5.7 days
Min-Cut 0.30 sec 1 sec 31 sec
paper demonstrates that the studied sparsest critical k-tuple
problem can be formulated as a MILP problem so that power-
ful MILP solvers such as CPLEX and Gurobi can be utilized.
On the other hand, by using topological network observability
results in [2], [21], a Min-Cut based approximate solution
procedure can be derived. The numerical experiment in this
paper reveals that the Min-Cut procedure is highly accurate
and efficient when there are a significant number of line power
flow measurements in the power network. Consequently, Min-
Cut should be the first method to attempt (over MILP) in this
scenario.
APPENDIX
Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose θ ⋆ is an optimal solution to (2) and I⋆ is such
that H( j, :)θ ⋆ 6= 0 if and only if j ∈ I⋆. Then Theorem 3
9states that I⋆ is a feasible solution to (1) with the objective
value card(I⋆) = card(Hθ ⋆). Now suppose I⋆ is not optimal
and there exists another feasible solution ˜I of (1) such that
card( ˜I) < card(I⋆). Then Theorem 3 states that there exists
˜θ , feasible in (2), such that card(H ˜θ )≤ card( ˜I)< card(I⋆) =
card(Hθ ⋆). This contradicts the assumption that θ ⋆ is an
optimal solution to (2). Hence, ˜I does not exist and I⋆ is an
optimal solution to (1). To establish the converse, suppose I⋆
is an optimal solution to (1). Then Theorem 3 states that there
exists θ ⋆ feasible to (2) such that card(Hθ ⋆) ≤ card(I⋆). In
fact, card(Hθ ⋆) = card(I⋆) and θ ⋆ is optimal to (2). If this is
not true, Theorem 3 implies that I⋆ would not be optimal.
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